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TROUBLE IN THE CARIBBEAN: RESPONSES 
TO A POTENTIAL CHINESE-BAHAMIAN 
BILATERAL FISHING AGREEMENT 
KYLE ELLIOTT∗ 
ABSTRACT 
As of 2011, the Caribbean Sea was one of the only fisheries 
unoccupied by China’s Distant Water Fleet (DWF). However, in 2016, 
officials from the People’s Republic of China and the Bahamas 
discussed a proposal for a bilateral commercial fishing agreement in 
Bahamian waters. An official agreement was never proposed, but given 
the notoriety of China’s DFW and the Bahamas’ monitoring and 
enforcement problems, such an agreement could have devastating 
impacts on the Caribbean fishery. 
The proposal received international criticism from fishermen, 
scientists, and politicians, demonstrating the perennial conflict between 
the global commercial fishing industry and those engaged in 
recreational, sport, or subsistence fishing. In 1982, the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) attempted to resolve 
this conflict by establishing fishery conservation measures. However, 
these measures are undermined by concepts such as maximum 
sustainable yield and optimum utilization, which prioritize the market 
value of a fishery’s resources over its recreational value. As the global 
commercial fishing industry begins to converge on one of the last 
fishing frontiers, the United States must shift how the world views 
fishery management. This article will discuss how stakeholders to the 
agreement can use both legal principles and non-legal incentives to 
induce the Bahamas to remain a sport fishing haven and support its 
artisanal fishing industry. 
 
Copyright © 2018 Kyle Elliot. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Although China’s Distant Water Fleet (DWF) extends to almost 
every major fishery in the world, as of 2011, Chinese commercial 
vessels were not fishing in the Caribbean Sea.1 However, in October 
2016, officials from the People’s Republic of China and the Bahamas 
shocked the Caribbean fishing community by discussing a proposal 
for a bilateral commercial fishing agreement in Bahamian waters.2 
While the Bahamas’ commercial fishing industry effectively captures 
inshore resources like spiny lobster, Nassau grouper, and queen 
conch,3 its offshore pelagic fishery4 is harvested exclusively by tourists 
and recreational fishers.5 Therefore, pelagic fish landings are often 
underreported, and the fishery is considered underexploited by 
current fishery management standards.6 
China is a cooperative member of many international 
conservation and sustainability organizations.7 However, in a 2009 
survey measuring compliance with the FAO’s Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries, China’s DWF had a failing grade in Illegal, 
Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, ranking 44th out of 53 
 
 1.  Daniel Pauly, et al., China’s Distant-Water Fisheries in the 21st Century, 15 FISH & 
FISHERIES 474, 477 (2014). 
 2.  Candia Dames, Letter Proves Gray Wrong, NASSAU GUARDIAN (Nov. 2, 2016), 
https://thenassauguardian.com/2016/11/02/letter-proves-gray-wrong/. 
 3.  CARIBBEAN REGIONAL FISHERIES MECHANISM, CRFM STATISTICS AND 
INFORMATION REPORT FOR 2012 32–33 (2014). The inshore fishery consists of species living in 
habitats from shallow-water coral reefs to the continental drop off point, where the continental 
shelf descends towards the deep ocean floor. Id. at 15–16 tbl.6.  
         4.  The offshore pelagic fishery consists of medium and large sized fish such as tuna, 
mackerel, and marlin, living in the open waters of the ocean. Id. at 15 tbl.6. 
         5.     ROB SOUTHWICK ET AL., FAO, W. Cent. Atl. Fishery Comm’n, Recreational 
Fisheries Economic Impact Assessment Manual and its Application in Two Study Cases in the 
Caribbean: Martinique and The Bahamas 95, 100 (2016). 
 5.   Id. 
 6.  See generally, BISESSAR CHAKALALL & KEVERN COCHRANE, FAO FISHERIES TECH. 
PAPER, MANAGEMENT OF LARGE PELAGIC FISHERIES IN CARICOM COUNTRIES 1 (Robin 
Mahon & Patrick McConney eds., 2004) (explaining the state of deep-water pelagic fisheries in 
CARICOM countries); Sean Hern, Competing Values: Taking a Broad View on the Narrowing 
Conservation Regime of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 16 AM. U. 
INT’L L. R. 177, 194–95 (2000) (arguing that UNCLOS concepts like maximum sustainable yield 
and optimum utilization emphasize the market value of a fishery over its potential value as a 
sports fishery, leading to the determination that the fishery is “underutilized”).   
 7.  See, e.g., Regional Fishery Bodies Summary Descriptions: International Commission 
for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, FAO, http://www.fao.org/fishery/rfb/iccat/en (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2018) (listing China as a member of ICCAT— the International Commission for the 
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas); About WCPFC, W. & CENT. PAC. FISHERIES COMM’N, 
https://www.wcpfc.int/about-wcpfc (last visited Apr. 6, 2018)(listing China as a member of the 
WCPFC— the Western & Central Pacific Fisheries Commission). 
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countries.8 Given the notoriety of China’s DFW9 and the Bahamas’ 
monitoring and enforcement problems,10 an agreement between 
China and the Bahamas could have a devastating impact on the 
Caribbean fishery. Stakeholders in Florida and in the Bahamas, many 
of whom rely on the fishery for either subsistence or recreational 
fishing, heavily criticized the proposed agreement.11 Eventually, 
discussions ceased before the Bahamian government officially 
considered an agreement.12 
Public response to a Chinese-Bahamian bilateral fishing 
agreement highlights the longstanding battle between the global 
commercial fishing industry and those engaged in recreational, sport, 
or subsistence fishing. However, current ocean law fails to strike a 
balance between these two parties, emphasizing the optimal 
exploitation of resources over non-consumptive management 
objectives.13 Although the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS) created some conservation measures,14 concepts 
such as maximum sustainable yield and optimum utilization 
undermine these measures by prioritizing the aggregate market value 
of a fishery’s resources.15 Policymakers should instead consider a 
 
 8.  TONY J. PITCHER, ET AL., SAFE CONDUCT? TWELVE YEARS FISHING UNDER THE UN 
CODE 26 (2008). Although this score was for China as a whole, rather than its Distant Water 
Fleet, the ranking can be mostly attributed to acts of the DWF since the China regulates its 
domestic fishing industry tighter than its DWF. See Tabitha Grace Mallory, Ph.D. Candidate in 
China Studies, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Testimony before the 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 5 (Jan. 26, 2012) [hereinafter Mallory 
Testimony].  
        9.     For a discussion of abuses by China’s DWF, see Section II.C. 
 10.  SOUTHWICK ET AL., supra note 5, at 100.  
 11.  Natario McKenzie, Fishermen Blast $2.1bn China Deal, TRIBUNE (Bah.), Nov. 7, 2016, 
http://www.tribune242.com/news/2016/nov/07/fishermen-blast-21bn-china-deal/ (reporting 
criticism from the president of the Bahamas Commercial Fishing Alliance); Jim Turner, Talks to 
Sell China Fishing Rights in Bahamas Alarm Florida, PALM BEACH POST, Nov. 16, 2016, 
http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/national/talks-sell-china-fishing-rights-bahamas-alarm-
florida/JAhVZ6Dozi3fgkZ6PgyJqM (noting the Florida Fish and Wildlife Commission’s 
concern over an agreement’s potential impact on the state’s fisheries); Steve Waters, Florida 
Anglers Help Stop Proposed China-Bahamas Deal, SUN SENTINEL, Nov. 29, 2016, 
http://www.sun-sentinel.com/sports/outdoors/fl-outdoors-fishing-report-1130-20161129-
story.html (noting that the Bahamian government was overwhelmed with contact from Florida 
fishermen denouncing a proposed Chinese-Bahamian fishing agreement).  
 12.  Sloan Smith, PM: Proposal with China is a no go, NASSAU GUARDIAN, Nov. 22, 2016, 
https://thenassauguardian.com/2016/11/22/pm-proposal-with-china-is-a-no-go/. 
 13.  EUGENE H. BUCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32185, U.N. CONVENTION ON THE 
LAW OF THE SEA: LIVING RESOURCES PROVISIONS 3 (2011). 
 14.  See generally United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 15.  Hern, supra note 6. 
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regime that adequately recognizes an area’s economic value as a 
sports fishery and conservation value as a conservation area. 
As the global commercial fishing industry begins to converge on 
one of the last fishing frontiers, the United States must shift how the 
world views fishery management. This article will discuss how the 
United States and other stakeholders can use both legal and non-legal 
incentives to induce the Bahamas to remain a sport-fishing haven and 
support its artisanal fishing industry.16 
II. A CHINESE-BAHAMIAN COMMERCIAL FISHING 
AGREEMENT: PARTIES, DISCUSSIONS, AND POTENTIAL 
PROBLEMS 
UNCLOS established rules governing the worlds’ oceans, many 
of which are now generally accepted principles of international law.17 
Central to these rules is the concept of an exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ), which is a 200 nautical mile limit around a coastal state in 
which the state has the exclusive right to explore, exploit, conserve, 
and manage natural resources.18 This right carries corresponding 
obligations, including a duty to promote the “optimum utilization” of 
resources within the EEZ.19 The duty of optimum utilization has 
contributed to numerous bilateral fishing agreements that allow a 
foreign state to exploit unused resources in a coastal state’s EEZ.20 
China is a major player in this industry, sending vessels to 
approximately 79 countries as of 2012.21 
 
 16.  Although this article will primarily focus on activities inside the Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ) of the Bahamas, many of the arguments may also apply to the rest of the 
Caribbean countries. The region’s tight concentration of sovereign islands results in a fishery 
consisting entirely of each country’s EEZ. Asha Singh, Governance in the Caribbean Sea: 
Implications for Sustainable Development 3 (Dec. 20, 2008) (unpublished research paper, 
United Nations- Nippon Foundation Fellowship Programme. The fishery does not have any 
high seas. Most countries in the Caribbean fishery are similar to the Bahamas in that they have 
modestly developed commercial fishing industries in relation to tourism. See generally 
CARIBBEAN REGIONAL FISHERIES MECHANISM, supra note 3 (describing each member states’ 
commercial fishing industries).  Thus, this article extends to the entire Caribbean fishery. 
 17.  For which provisions are considered customary international law, see Ashley J. Roach, 
Today’s Customary International Law of the Sea, 45 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 239 (2014). 
 18.  UNCLOS, supra note 14, at art. 56. 
 19.  Id. at art. 62. 
 20.  Mallory Testimony, supra note 8, at 2. 
 21.  BLOMEYER, ET AL., EUR. PARL. COMM. ON FISHERIES, THE ROLE OF CHINA IN 
WORLD FISHERIES 67 (2012). Due to the lack of transparency surrounding Chinese bilateral 
agreements, the exact number of countries with which China has officially formed an agreement 
is difficult to calculate. Id. 
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A. The Parties 
The Commonwealth of the Bahamas, located only 50 miles from 
the United States at its closest point, is a sovereign archipelagic state 
in the Caribbean containing over 700 islands, cays, and islets.22 
Because of its dispersed nature, the Bahamas has the largest EEZ in 
the Caribbean, more than double the size of the next largest 
country.23 To put this into perspective, the Bahamas’ EEZ is only 28 
percent smaller than China’s EEZ, despite having a fraction of the 
land area and economic resources.24 Perhaps due to its proximity to 
the United States and vast ocean resources, the Bahamas boasts the 
second highest per capita GDP in the Caribbean, 75-80 percent of 
which comes from tourism.25 Recreational fishing contributes to 
approximately five percent of the country’s total GDP, while 
commercial fishing contributes to less than one percent.26 
Bahamian fisheries consist of the following sectors: (1) an 
artisanal commercial fishery that primarily targets demersal species, 
such as queen conch and spiny lobster; (2) a large-scale, commercial 
spiny lobster fishery; (3) a sport and recreational fishery; and (4) a 
subsistence fishery in which fish are consumed by fishers and their 
families.27 Although the Bahamas’ commercial fishing industry 
effectively captures inshore resources like spiny lobster, Nassau 
grouper, and queen conch,28 its offshore pelagic fishery is harvested 
exclusively by tourists and recreational fishers targeting species like 
mahi-mahi, wahoo, tuna, swordfish, and marlin.29 
China’s Distant Water Fishing Fleet (DWF) is the other party to 
the potential agreement. “Distant waters” refer to major fishing areas 
 
 22.  Geography, THE BAHAMAS, http://www.bahamas.co.uk/about-the-bahamas/facts/ 
geography (last visited Dec. 11, 2017). 
 23.  CARIBBEAN REGIONAL FISHERIES MECHANISM, supra note 3, at 4. 
 24.  Although the boundaries of both country’s EEZ is in dispute, the Bahamas’ EEZ is 
approximately 629,293 sq. km., while China’s EEZ is 877, 019 sq. km. Id. at 4. 
 25.  The World Factbook: The Bahamas, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/bf.html (last updated Nov. 29, 2017). 
 26.  In 2014, the total GDP of the Bahamas was $8.98 billion. Id. At this time, the FAO 
estimated that the recreational fishing industry contributed approximately $411 million to the 
GDP and commercial fishing contributed approximately $80 million. SOUTHWICK ET AL., supra 
note 5, at 99. This comes out to about 4.6% and .09%, respectively. 
 27.  Nicola S. Smith & Dirk Zeller, Bahamas Catch Reconstruction: Fisheries Trends in a 
Tourism-Driven Economy (1950-2010) 2 (Fisheries Ctr., U. OF B.C., Working Paper No. 2013-
08, 2008) http://www.seaaroundus.org/doc/publications/wp/2013/Smith-and-Zeller-Bahamas.pdf. 
 28.  CARIBBEAN REGIONAL FISHERIES MECHANISM, supra note 3, at 32–34 tbl.17. 
 29.  Id.; SOUTHWICK ET AL., supra note 5. 
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that are not adjacent to the fishing country, such as the high seas30 or 
the EEZ of another country.31 In 2010, China’s DWF became the 
largest in the world, totaling approximately 1,900 vessels.32 At this 
time, the fleet consisted mainly of old vessels without adequate 
equipment and technology for long-range sea travel.33 Therefore, its 
production capacity was lower than fleets in other developed 
countries.34 To combat this problem, China implemented a five-year 
plan to develop large-scale fishing operations expected to produce 1.7 
million tons by 2015. The plan included measures to expand and 
update the DWF fleet and utilize remote ports in fishing operations.35 
The initiative succeeded. From 2013 to 2014, the fleets’ catch 
estimates grew from 1.35 million tons to 2 million tons – a 48 percent 
increase.36 This figure might be much larger; a study by the European 
Parliament contends that China massively underreports its DWF 
statistics by overlooking catches from IUU fishing and catches from 
joint ventures with a coastal country to fish in that country’s EEZ.37 
The study estimates that China’s DWF instead caught an average of 
4.6 million tons a year from 2000 to 2011.38 Regardless, it is clear that 
China’s DWF has become one of the world’s most powerful fishing 
fleets. 
China has many possible motivations for expanding its DWF 
fleet. First, the country has a growing need for fish as a domestic food 
source. Although fish consumption is difficult to estimate, even 
conservative approximations show that China’s fish consumption has 
more than doubled since 1990.39 However, an analysis of what 
 
 30.  The area outside a country’s EEZ is known as the “high seas.” UNCLOS, supra note 
14, at art. 86. This area is open for fishing to all states. Id. at art. 87. 
 31.  Mallory Testimony, supra note 8, at 2. 
 32.  Id. at 3. 
 33.  FAO, THE STATE OF WORLD FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE 31 (2016), 
http://www.fao.org/3/a-i5555e.pdf [hereinafter State of the World’s Fisheries]. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Mallory Testimony, supra note 8, at 3. 
 36. FAO, STATE OF THE WORLD’S FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE, supra note 33, at 9–10 
(noting the catch estimates officially reported by China). The catch statistics of China’s DWF, 
depend on the fleet’s scope. China’s EEZ is located in a larger area known as “61 Northwest 
Pacific.” Id. China officially reported the above statistics for catches from its distant water 
fishery. However, this includes all area outside China’s EEZ, including the area inside 61 
Northwest Pacific. If the scope of China’s DWF is narrowed to include only the area outside 61 
Northwest Pacific, the catch statistics would be much smaller– 586,000 tons in 2013 and 880,000 
tons in 2014. These figures still amount to about a 50% increase. Id.   
 37.  Id. at 21. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  BLOMEYER, ET AL., supra note 21, at 59–60. 
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Chinese companies do with the fish might reveal a more telling 
motivation. One expert estimated that China exported almost half of 
its fish (many of which were high-value fish) to developed countries, 
implying that the growth of China’s DWF is driven by economic 
concerns rather than domestic food consumption.40 Finally, China 
may view current ocean expansion as the key to guarding future 
ocean interests. In 2010, China created a task force to analyze its 
DWF industry.41 In advocating for expansion of the fleet, the task 
force argued that the countries with longer histories of using the 
ocean have more influence on how ocean resources are distributed 
and receive a larger share.42 Policy makers should consider these 
drivers when determining how to best limit the environmental impact 
of China’s DWF in the Caribbean. 
China’s DWF industry is heavily dependent on subsidies.43 In 
fact, Chinese economists estimated that government subsidies 
accounted for approximately half of the net profits of China National 
Fisheries Corporation, the country’s largest international fishing 
company.44 Perhaps because of this dependence, the once state-
owned industry is now 70% privately owned.45 As a result, the 
Chinese government has lost control of its DWF industry, leading to 
inaccurate reporting by the fleet.46 In a 2009 study measuring 
countries’ compliance with the FAO Code of Conduct of Responsible 
Fisheries, China received a passing score on intentions but a failing 
score on enforcement.47 Unlike state-owned fisheries, private 
companies do not report data for accidentally caught recreational fish 
species, and they report inaccurate information regarding location  
 
 
 
 
 
 40.  Tabitha Mallory, China’s Distant Water Fishing Industry: Evolving Policies and 
Implications, 38 MARINE POL’Y 99, 100 (2013) [hereinafter China’s DWF Industry]. 
 41.  Mallory Testimony, supra note 8, at 3.  
 42.  Id. (discussing the task force’s report). The report stated, “if you occupy and possess, 
then you have rights and interests.” Id. 
 43.  Id. at 4. 
 44.  See id. (discussing a report from three Chinese economists); About us, CHINA NAT’L 
FISHERIES CORP., http://www.cnfc.com.cn/view_en.asp?classid=14 (last visited Dec. 10, 2017). 
 45.  BLOMEYER ET AL., supra note 21, at 31. 
 46.  Mallory Testimony, supra note 8, at 3. 
 47.  PITCHER ET AL., supra note 8, at 11 fig.5. 
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and species type.48 This creates problems for host countries seeking to 
measure the impact of China’s DWF on the country’s resources.49 
B. Discussion Timeline & Proposal Details 
In a letter dated October 3, 2016, the Minister of Agriculture and 
Marine Resources for the Bahamas authorized the Ambassador to 
China to pursue an agreement that would China access to fishing 
rights in Bahamian waters.50 The Bahamian Ambassador to China 
did, in fact, speak to a Chinese official about such an agreement.51 
The contemplated proposal allowed for 100 corporate entities, each 
equally owned by Chinese and Bahamian companies, to receive 
commercial fishing licenses.52 In return, over a 10-year period, the 
Chinese promised to invest $2.1 billion in the form of cash, 
equipment, and expertise.53 Although the proposal called for joint 
ownership of the companies, it prohibited non-Bahamians from 
operating the fishing vessels.54 The proposal did not specify what 
species of fish the new vessels would target, but most people believe 
the agreement was intended to exploit the Bahamas’ pelagic 
migratory fish resources.55 
Prior to 2016, the Bahamas had been opposed to any kind of 
foreign fishing. In 1993, controversy arose when a faction of the 
Bahamian cabinet reportedly considered allowing foreign fleets of 
 
 48.  JIAHUA CHENG ET AL., AN ESTIMATION OF COMPLIANCE OF THE FISHERIES OF 
CHINA WITH ARTICLE 7 (FISHERIES MANAGEMENT) OF THE UN CODE OF CONDUCT FOR 
RESPONSIBLE FISHING 9 (2013), https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid= 
ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbnx0b255cGl0Y2hlcndlYnNpdGV8Z3g6Njc5ZWMwMTc1OTY3Nm
MxYg. 
 49.  See infra pp. 13–14 (discussing effect of unreliable data on overfishing). 
 50.  Dames, supra note 2.  
 51.  Rashad Rolle, D’Aguilar: Govt Selling Souls to the Chinese, TRIBUNE (Bah.) (Nov. 3, 
2016), http://www.tribune242.com/news/2016/nov/03/daguilar-govt-selling-souls-chinese/. 
 52.  Dames, supra note 2. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  BNT Statement on Proposal for Chinese Funding for Investment in Bahamian Fishing 
Industry, BAHAMAS NATIONAL TRUST (Nov. 5, 2016), https://bnt.bs/bnt-statement-on-chinese-
investment-bahamian-fishing-industry/ (noting that scientific assessments of pelagic fish stocks 
would be necessary to be fully informed of the ramifications of the agreement). The Bahamian 
Ambassador to China stated that he “planned to meet with Bahamian fishermen to see if there 
was any interest in joint ventures with Chinese capital to expand into areas that are traditionally 
not exploited.” Id. The deep-water pelagic fishery is one of the last Bahamian fisheries not 
exploited by the commercial sector. CARIBBEAN REGIONAL FISHERIES MECHANISM, supra 
note 3, at 32–34 tbl.17.  Given Ambassador Gomez’s comments, current speculation over the 
agreements purpose is probably correct.   
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long-line trawlers access to the country’s fisheries.56 Parliament 
responded by banning long-line fishing.57 In 2003, a fleet of Korean 
fishing vessels was spotted fishing in Bahamian waters under the 
banner of a Bahamian company.58 However, the Bahamian 
government did not issue the company permits, and the fleet 
departed.59 In 2007, the country allowed a Chinese company to 
“experimentally” harvest shark fins and sea cucumbers as part of a 
joint venture with the Bahamas.60 Sharks were later protected, but the 
company is still harvesting sea cucumbers.61 Considering the 
government’s prior protectionist attitude towards its fisheries, 
discussions between Bahamian and Chinese officials regarding a 
bilateral fishing agreement represent a significant policy shift. 
The discussions received heavy criticism from U.S. Senator 
Marco Rubio, Floridian stakeholders, fishermen, environmental 
groups, scientists, and members of the Bahamian government.62 
Although the Bahamian government repeatedly downplayed the 
discussions, there is reason to believe that a similar agreement could 
happen in the future.63 Even after the Bahamian Prime Minister 
stated that the cabinet would have rejected such a proposal, the 
Minister of Agriculture and Marine Resources stated that he “has not 
withdrawn the letter,” and expressed fear that the Chinese would  
 
 
 
 56.  Larry Smith, Tough Call: What Chinese Fishing Proposal Means for the Bahamas, 
TRIBUNE (Bah.), Nov. 9, 2016, http://www.tribune242.com/news/2016/nov/09/tough-call-what-
chinese-fishing-proposal-means-bah/. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.   Id. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  See Nominations Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, infra note 166 (quoting 
Sen. Marco Rubio); Natario McKenzie, Fishermen Blast $2.1bn China Deal, THE TRIBUNE 
(Bah.), November 7, 2016, http://www.tribune242.com/news/2016/nov/07/fishermen-blast-21bn-
china-deal/ (reporting criticism from the president of the Bahamas Commercial Fishing 
Alliance); Jim Turner, Talks to Sell China Fishing Rights in Bahamas Alarm Florida, PALM 
BEACH POST, November 16, 2016 (noting the Florida Fish and Wildlife Commission’s concern 
over an agreement’s potential impact on the state’s fisheries); Steve Waters, Florida Anglers 
Help Stop Proposed China-Bahamas Deal, SUN SENTINEL, November 29, 2016 (noting that the 
Bahamian government was overwhelmed with contact from Florida fishermen denouncing a 
proposed Chinese-Bahamian fishing agreement); Dames, supra note 2. 
 63.  Sancheska Dorsett, Gray: Govt Would Not Give Foreigners License to Fish, TRIBUNE 
(Bah.) (Nov. 3, 2016), http://www.tribune242.com/news/2016/nov/03/gray-govt-would-not-give-
foreigners-licence-fish/. 
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discontinue investment in the country due to the criticism.64 Such a 
deal could have damaging effects to the Caribbean fishery. 
C. Foreseeable Problems with a Chinese-Bahamian Joint Venture 
Although bilateral agreements allow developing countries to 
harvest their fishery resources, fisheries governance experts argue 
that “[bilateral agreements] on the whole have led to unsustainable 
use of fisheries resources and have negatively impacted the 
socioeconomic development of host countries.”65 Major problems 
with these agreements include pollution,66 conflicts with artisanal 
fisherman,67 and unsustainable fishing methods.68 A Chinese-
Bahamian deal like the one discussed would generate some of the 
issues that plagued past bilateral agreements while avoiding others. 
Such a deal would also create unique problems not experienced by 
other nations. While some of these issues affect only the Bahamas, 
many also impact the United States because of the countries’ close 
proximity and the migratory nature of many fish stocks. This section 
analyzes these potential problems. 
i. Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing 
IUU fishing is perhaps the largest concern with a Chinese-
Bahamian joint venture. This includes “fishing without a license or 
quota for certain species, unauthorized transshipments to cargo 
vessels, failing to report catches or making false reports, keeping 
undersized fish or fish that are otherwise protected by regulations, 
fishing in closed areas or during closed seasons, and using prohibited 
fishing gear.”69 A Chinese-Bahamian bilateral agreement is 
 
 64.  Gray Suggests Chinese Agri-Fisheries Deal Still Open to Negotiation, THE NASSAU 
GUARDIAN, Nov. 10, 2016, https://thenassauguardian.com/2016/11/10/gray-suggests-chinese-
agri-fisheries-deal-still-open-to-negotiation/. 
 65.  China’s DWF Industry, supra note 40, at 103. 
 66.  See e.g., Afp Gunjur, Pollution Clouds Gambia’s China Courtship, TAIPEI TIMES, Jul. 
31, 2017, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2017/07/31/2003675663 (describing 
the destruction caused by pollution from a Chinese fishmeal factory intended to support China’s 
DWF in Gambia). 
 67.  See e.g., China’s DWF Industry, supra note 40, at 104 (describing conflicts between 
Chinese DWF vessels and artisanal fishermen in Liberia). 
 68.  For a general discussion on the effects of unsustainable fishing practices in bilateral 
agreements see Jacqueline Alder & Ussif Rashid Sumaila, Western Africa: A Fish Basket of 
Europe Past and Present, 13 J. ENV’T. & DEV. 156, 169 (2004) (noting that “[m]any fishers in 
Ghana have actually become poorer as the landed values from their fisheries have increased”). 
 69.  IUU Fishing- Frequently Asked Questions, NOAA, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ 
ia/iuu/faqs.html (last visited Dec. 10, 2017). 
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particularly susceptible to IUU fishing given the notorious fishing 
practices of China’s DWF and the Bahamas’ inability to sufficiently 
monitor or enforce fishing regulations. 
In a 2009 study, the Chinese DWF ranked 44 out of 53 countries 
in IUU fishing with an “unequivocally failing” score.70 Many 
developing countries that enter into bilateral agreements with China 
do not have the financial resources to survey vessels or enforce 
fishing regulations.71 For example, in Cameroon, Chinese DWF 
vessels, many of which are legally registered as Cameroon businesses 
in accordance with a joint venture agreement between the two 
countries, are beginning to overwhelm the Cameroonian navy.72 Even 
if the agreement calls for so-called “dedicated funds” to support the 
fishery sector from the increase in fishing activity, governments in 
coastal countries rarely use these funds for their intended purposes.73 
The Bahamas have multiple weaknesses in monitoring and 
enforcement that make IUU fishing a major risk. Although West 
African countries are commonly thought to have too few resources to 
combat IUU fishing in their waters, the Bahamas ranks lower in GDP 
per square kilometer of EEZ than Cameroon, Angola, Ghana, 
Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Gambia, and Sierra Leone.74 The fact 
that only Bahamian citizens would be operating the fishing vessels is 
hardly consequential, considering Chinese DWF companies would 
manage the vessels’ operations. A similar agreement is in place in 
Cameroon, where IUU fishing regularly persists.75  
Furthermore, the Bahamas has a long history of overfishing,76 
which has continued for some species. The Caribbean Spiny Lobster, 
by far the leading species captured in the Bahamas,77 is considered 
 
 70.  PITCHER, ET AL., supra note 8, at 26. 
 71.  Alder & Sumaila, supra note 68, at 170. 
 72.  China’s DWF Industry, supra note 40, at 106; Moki Edwin Kindzeka, Cameroon 
Deploys Navy to Seize Illegal Fishing Vessels, VOICE OF AMERICA (Oct. 10, 2016), 
https://www.voanews.com/a/cameroon-navy-fishing-boats/3544226.html. 
 73.  See Vlad M. Kaczynski & David L. Fluharty, European policies in West Africa: Who 
Benefits from Fisheries Agreements?, 26 MARINE POL’Y 75, 77, n.5, n.6 (2003) (describing the 
use of dedicated funds in Guinea Bissau). 
 74.  See infra, note 84 and accompanying text. 
 75.  See Kindzeka, supra note 72. 
 76.  See MICHAEL CRATON & GAIL SAUNDERS, ISLANDERS IN THE STREAM: A HISTORY 
OF THE BAHAMIAN PEOPLE 88–89 (Univ. of GA. Press, 2011) (describing the seventeenth 
century Bahamian seal hunting industry); HENRY FRANK MOORE, THE COMMERCIAL 
SPONGES AND THE SPONGE FISHERIES 471 (1910) (claiming that the Bahamian sponge fishery 
had become “exhausted by overfishing” as early as 1875). 
 77.  CARIBBEAN REGIONAL FISHERIES MECHANISM, supra note 3, at 32–34 tbl.17. 
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overexploited by some experts.78 Even experts that believe the fishery 
is in good condition have expressed concerns over the reported 
decline in landings and size.79 The Nassau Grouper, the most landed 
finfish in the country, is also likely either fully exploited or over-
exploited in the Bahamas and United States.80 
Overfishing is primarily due to insufficient resources and 
unreliable data.81 Experts estimate that from 1950 through 1986, the 
Bahamas fishery had more unreported catch than reported catch– in 
some years, unreported catch more than doubles the amount of 
reported fish caught.82  However, reporting failures are not only a 
historical issue. In 2014, an estimated 40% of total catch went 
unreported.83 Out of 151 qualifying countries, the Bahamas ranked 
128th in GDP per square kilometer of EEZ,84 and the Department of 
Marine Resources has only six full-time vessels85 to enforce 
regulations for approximately 628,000 square kilometers86 of ocean. 
This trend will only persist if China’s DWF enters the region. 
Second, much of the data on the Bahamian commercial fishing 
industry are unreliable and outdated, and regional fishery 
management organizations have difficulty measuring how many 
 
 78.  See e.g. Ernesto A. Chavez, Potential Production of the Caribbean Spiny Lobster 
(Decapoda, Palinura) Fisheries, 82 CRUSTACEANA 1393, 1400–01 (2009). 
 79.  Id. at 1401. 
 80.  See 81 C.F.R. § 42268 (2016) (listing the Nassau Grouper as threatened under the 
Endangered Species Act); NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., NASSAU GROUPER, EPINEPHELUS 
STRIATUS (BLOCH 1792) BIOLOGICAL REPORT 50 (2013). 
 81.  See Chavez, supra note 78, at 1401 (noting the difficulty in monitoring and 
enforcement of the spiny lobster fishery); NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 80 at 
46–53 (noting the data collection problems associated with Nassau Grouper landings). 
 82.  Catches by Reporting Status in the Waters of Bahamas, THE SEA AROUND US, 
http://www.seaaroundus.org/data/#/eez/44?chart=catch-chart&dimension=reporting-
status&measure=tonnage&limit=10 (last visited Dec. 15, 2017). 
 83.  See id. (estimating that the Bahamas had 8,480 tons of unreported catch, out of 20,780 
tons total). 
 84.  This ranking was created by combining GDP statistics from the International 
Monetary Fund and EEZ statistics from the Sea Around Us, a research initiative at The 
University of British Columbia. World Economic Outlook Database, INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY FUND (Oct. 2017), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/02/weodata/ 
download.asp; Simon Claus et al., Marine Regions: Towards a Global Standard for 
Georeferenced Marine Names and Boundaries, 37 MARINE GEODESY 99 (2014); Tools & Data, 
SEA AROUND US, http://www.seaaroundus.org/data/#/eez (last visited Dec. 11, 2017).  
 85.  About The Department of Marine Resources, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE BAHAMAS, 
http://www.bahamas.gov.bs (follow “Agency Sites” hyperlink; then follow “Marine Resources, 
Dept. of” hyperlink; then follow “About Us” hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 11, 2017). 
 86.  Catches by Taxon in the Waters of Bahamas, SEA AROUND US, 
http://www.seaaroundus.org/data/#/eez/44?chart=catchchart&dimension=taxon&measure=tonn
age&limit=10 (last visited Dec. 11, 2017). 
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vessels are fishing in Bahamian waters.87 Exacerbating this problem, 
commercial vessels less than 20 feet in length are not required to 
obtain a commercial fishing permit.88  Furthermore, catch statistics 
reported to the FAO do not include recreational landings.89 One 
study estimated that total landings in the Bahamas were over two and 
a half times greater than the reported amount, primarily due to 
tourist and sport fishing catches.90 This unreliable data creates 
problems for policymakers attempting to issue licenses, set 
regulations, and determine the maximum sustainable yield of the 
fishery. 
The reliability and strength of a host country’s government is 
another factor that leads to IUU fishing. In many cases, IUU fishing 
is exacerbated by corrupt government officials who allow the DWF to 
operate beyond the terms of agreements or in previously prohibited 
ways.91 For example, in Vanuatu, a small, pacific-island nation, the 
director of the Maritime Authority was also the shipping agent for 
foreign long-line vessels.92 Reportedly, “on the same day that he 
donated two trucks to the Department of Fisheries, fishing licenses 
were granted to two . . . [foreign] long-liners that allowed them to 
operate within the six-mile zone off the coast, which was formerly 
prohibited under Vanuatu law.”93 Other times, governments fail to 
enforce fishing regulations for Chinese vessels because they do not 
want to jeopardize other government aid projects China sponsors.94 
For example, in Guinea Bissau, the government exempted Chinese 
 
 87.  See e.g., CARIBBEAN REGIONAL FISHERIES MECHANISM, supra note 3, at 20 n.26 
(noting that the 2012 data on the number of commercial fishing vessels came from the last 
Bahamas fishery census in 1995). 
 88.  Fisheries Resources (Jurisdiction and Conservation) (Act. No. 1/2006) (Bah.) ¶ 11(2). 
 89.  Smith & Zeller, supra note 27, at 1. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Alder & Sumaila, supra note 68, at 170. 
 92.  Marie-Noelle Ferrieux-Patterson, Conflict of Interest - Vanuatu’s Experience, in 
CONTROLLING CORRUPTION IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 4TH REGIONAL 
ANTI-CORRUPTION CONFERENCE 71, 73 (2003), https://www.oecd.org/site/adboecdanti-
corruptioninitiative/regionalseminars/35137722.pdf. 
 93. Id. at 73. 
 94.  China’s DWF Industry, supra note 40, at 103; but see Ecuador Jails Chinese Fisherman 
Found with 6,000 Sharks, REUTERS (Aug. 28, 2017) (stating that an Ecuadorian judge sentenced 
Chinese fishermen to up to 4 years in prison for illegally fishing in a marine sanctuary); Rachael 
Bale, Thousands of Sharks Found on Boat in Huge Illegal Haul, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 15, 
2017), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/08/wildlife-watch-galapagos-illegal-shark-
fishing/ (noting that the Ecuadorian government has been criticized for leniently enforcing 
fishing regulations with China because China provides a large amount of the government’s 
funding). 
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boats from laws that prohibit commercial fishing boats from off-
loading fish catches in foreign ports or onto other ships at sea.95 Such 
preferential treatment hurts the domestic and artisanal fishing 
industries of host countries and nurtures illegal and unreported 
fishing. 
It might be argued that the Bahamas need not be as concerned 
about corruption affecting a bilateral fishing agreement since the 
Bahamas has considerably higher governance indicators than many of 
the West African countries currently dealing with Chinese IUU 
fishing.96 However, the country’s fishing laws make it particularly 
susceptible to corruption. For example, the Bahamas has primarily 
regulated its fishery through the Fisheries Resources (Jurisdiction and 
Conservation) Act, which banned long-line fishing and prohibited 
non-Bahamians from participating in commercial fishing within the 
country’s EEZ.97 Foreign vessels may, however, fish commercially as 
part of an official treaty if authorized by the Prime Minister.98 
Furthermore, parties foreign commercial vessels may also fish if they 
receive permission from the governor-general after “it is shown to the 
satisfaction of the Governor-General that the pursuit of long-line 
fishing . . . would not endanger elements essential to sustainable 
fishery development and would not prejudice the development and 
expansion of eco-tourism in The Bahamas.”99 This standard appears 
to give the governor-general absolute discretion in permitting 
commercial vessels. Therefore, if the Bahamian governor general 
decided to give long-line fishing permits to select Chinese-Bahamian 
joint ventures, the Fisheries Resources Act appears to allow it. 
Conflicts arising from IUU fishing are hardly limited to DWF 
vessels legally fishing under a bilateral agreement. Notably, three 
Chinese fishermen were killed after the South Korean Coast Guard, 
which suspected the vessel of illegal fishing, threw flash bang 
 
 95.  ANDRE STANDING, CHR. MICHELSEN INST., CORRUPTION AND INDUSTRIAL FISHING 
IN AFRICA 12 (2008), https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3188-corruption-and-industrial-
fishing-in-africa.pdf. 
 96.  See Daniel Kaufman et al., The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and 
Analytical Issues (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5430, 2010); Kaufman et al., 
Worldwide Governance Indicators, THE WORLD BANK, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/ 
wgi/#home (last visited Dec. 11, 2017) (comparing The Bahamas to Cameroon, Ghana, and 
Guinea-Bissau across six governance indicators). 
 97.  Fisheries Resources (Jurisdiction and Conservation) (Act. No. 1/2006) (Bah.) ¶7 
(prohibiting foreign fishing but creating an exception for sport fishing); Id. at ¶ 2 (defining 
“exclusive fishery zone”); Id at ¶ 22 (prohibiting long-line fishing). 
 98.  Id. at ¶ 7–10. 
 99.  Id. at ¶ 22(1). 
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grenades into the boat’s cabin.100 Furthermore, the Argentinian Coast 
Guard sunk a Chinese trawler in its EEZ the after the vessel 
reportedly ignored warning shots and attempted to ram the Coast 
Guard ship.101 The Chinese vessel, which should have been in the high 
seas, did not have authority to fish in Argentina’s EEZ.102 In 2017, the 
Ecuadorian Navy discovered the Fu Yuan Yu Leng 999 in the 
Galapagos National Park with almost 300 tons of fish on board.103 
Recently, the Bahamas has encountered similar problems with illegal 
fishing by unauthorized vessels; this will only intensify with Chinese 
DWF vessels in the Caribbean.104 
Scholars also consider several other factors to determine whether 
a country is vulnerable to IUU fishing.105 These factors, which include 
the number of internationally attractive species in a country’s 
territorial waters, patrol boats per 100,000 square kilometers, 
detectible fishing vessels, “monitoring, control, and surveillance” 
(MCS) efforts, and proximity to “ports of convenience,” can predict a 
country’s vulnerability to IUU fishing.106  The Bahamas ranks poorly 
in many of these factors.107 
Proximity to ports of convenience, ports used by IUU vessels to 
transport illegal catches to international markets, are especially 
important facilitators of illegal fishing.108  A country is considered to 
have access to a port of convenience if it is located within 1500 
nautical miles of the port.109 The Bahamas has access to at least one 
 
 100.  Choe Sang-Hun, South Korea Investigates Deaths of 3 Chinese Fishermen in 
Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2016. 
 101.  Argentina Sinks Chinese Fishing Boat Lu Yan Yuan Yu 010, BRITISH BROADCASTING 
COMPANY (MARCH 16, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-35815444. 
 102.   Id. 
     103.   Rachael Bale, Thousands of Sharks Found on Boat in Huge Illegal Haul, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 15, 2017), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/08/wildlife-watch-
galapagos-illegal-shark-fishing/.  
 104.  Timothy Roberts, Long Line Fishing Speculated to be Increasing in Bahamian Waters, 
THE ABACONIAN (Bah.), Feb. 4, 2014, http://www.theabaconian.com/2014/02/04/long-line-
fishing-speculated-to-be-increasing-in-bahamian-waters/. 
 105.  See generally Gohar A. Petrossian, Preventing Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated 
(IUU) Fishing: A Situational Approach, 189 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 39, 46 (2015) 
(determining which factors most effect IUU fishing). 
 106.  See id. at 41 (analyzing the strength of each of these variables in explaining IUU 
fishing). 
 107. See infra notes 108–112 (presenting statistics that show the Bahamas measures poorly 
in proximity to ports of convenience and patrol boats per 1,000 kilometers).  
 108.  Id at 46; but see id. at 45 fig.3 (noting that the impact of ports of convenience are less 
extreme in the Caribbean than in other geographic areas). 
 109.  Id. at 41.  
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port of convenience, Port Cartagena, Colombia, which allows IUU 
fishing vessels to easily sell their illegal catch.110 This makes the 
Bahamas a prime target for illegal fishing by both legally registered 
commercial vessels and unauthorized DWF vessels. The two strongest 
variables for predicting IUU fishing in the Caribbean are the number 
of patrol boats per 100,000 square kilometers of EEZ and MCS 
efforts.111 In this regard, the Bahamas ranks lower than both Ghana 
and Cameroon, both countries that have struggled to control IUU 
fishing.112 Given the Bahamas’ struggles with monitoring IUU fishing 
before expansion of its commercial fishery, it is hard to imagine that 
the new commercial fishing vessels would abide by prudent catch 
limits or regulations on techniques.113 
The presence of China’s DWF in the Bahamas could also 
increase IUU fishing in other Caribbean countries. First, many 
Caribbean countries are closer ports of convenience than the 
Bahamas.114 Also, the Caribbean consists of undeveloped countries 
that are particularly susceptible to IUU fishing due to an inability to 
invest in fisheries management and patrol surveillance resources.115 
From this perspective, these countries are similar to many of the West 
African countries struggling with IUU fishing.116 
 
 110.  See id. (classifying Port Cartagena as a port of convenience). The distance from the 
Port of Nassau to Port Cartagena is 1183 nautical miles. Sea Route & Distance, PORTS.COM (last 
visited, Dec. 11, 2017). 
 111.  Petrossian, supra note 105, at 43 fig.1 (presenting the strength of the predictor 
variables in each region). Overall, the study found that monitoring activities and the number of 
internationally attractive species were the two best predictors of IUU fishing. Id. at 42. 
However, neither the number of internationally attractive species nor ports of convenience had 
a large impact on IUU fishing in Central and South America. Id. at 44–45 fig.2,3.  
 112.  See generally ERIC WERTHEIM, THE NAVAL INSTITUTE GUIDE TO COMBAT FLEETS 
OF THE WORLD (16th ed. 2013) (for the number of patrol boats of each country); Tools & Data, 
THE SEA AROUND US, http://www.seaaroundus.org/data/#/eez (last visited Dec. 15, 2017)(for 
the size of the EEZ of each country). 
 113.  Nico Scavella, University Professors Warn of Dangers of $2.1bn Andros Plan, TRIBUNE 
(Nassau, Bah.) (Nov. 14, 2016). 
 114.  See e.g., Sea Route & Distance, PORTS.COM (last visited, Dec. 11, 2017). Port-au-Prince, 
Haiti is located 704 nautical miles from Port Cartagna. Id. Port Royal, Jamaica is located 373 
nautical miles from Port Cartagna. Id. 
 115.  See e.g., SELIM JAHAN, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 
2016 200 tbl.1 (2016) (classifying Haiti as a country with low human development); See 
Petrossian, supra note 105, at 45. 
 116.  See JAHAN, supra note 115 tbl.1 (classifying Cameroon and Guinea-Bissau as a 
countries with low human development).  
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ii. Targeting Migratory Fish: Impact on Artisanal Fishermen 
& Other Countries 
A commercial fishing industry that targets migratory species is 
problematic.117 Large pelagic fish are not located in the Bahamas 
throughout the entire year.118 Once these fish migrate from the 
Bahamas, China’s DWF will be faced with three choices: 1) follow the 
fish, 2) shift production to another permanent species, or 3) cease 
production and wait until the fish return. The third option seems 
improbable given the amount of investment China would put into the 
agreement, and the other two options are similarly challenging. 
The geography of the Caribbean fishery makes following the 
migratory fish unlikely. Scientists estimate that mahi-mahi migrate at 
least 8,000 miles throughout the Caribbean Sea, United States waters, 
and high seas.119 Although the DWF could normally follow the fish 
into the high seas, countries in the Caribbean fishery are so 
concentrated that the entire fishery consists of country’s EEZs.120 
Absent an agreement with the other Caribbean country, following the 
fish would constitute IUU fishing. 
Shifting production to a permanent species during slow months is 
also problematic for the Bahamian domestic fishing industry. Many of 
the deep-water pelagic fish migrate by September, at which time more 
permanent species like snapper and grouper are still plentiful.121 
While the large pelagic fishery might be underexploited in the 
Bahamas, it is doubtful that stocks of other, more permanent species 
could handle an influx of 100 commercial fishing vessels.122 
Furthermore, these species are critical to the artisanal fishermen.123 
 
 117.  See IVAN GOODBODY & ELIZABETH M. THOMAS-HOPE, NATURAL RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN 170–71 (2002) (posing 
the question, “[W]hat do you do when species migrates?”). 
 118.  Bahamas Fishing Calendar, BAHAMAS FISHING CHARTERS, 
http://www.fishinthebahamas.com/bahamas-fishing-calendar/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2017). 
 119.  DOLPHINFISH RES. PROGRAM, General Movement Patterns, COOPERATIVE SCIENCE 
SERVICES http://dolphintagging.homestead.com/GenMovePatterns.html (last visited Dec. 13, 
2017). 
 120.  Singh, supra note 16, at 3. 
 121.  See Bahamas Fishing Calendar, supra note 118 (showing that in September, fishing for 
Bluefin Tuna, Mahi-Mahi, Kingfish, White Marlin, Blue Marlin, and Wahoo is either “Fair” or 
“Poor”). 
     122.   See, e.g., 81 C.F.R. § 42268 (2016) (stating that the Nassau Grouper is over-exploited in 
the Bahamas). 
 123. See Nicole M. Cushioin & Kathleen Sullivan-Sealey, Landings, Effort and Socio-
economics of a Small Scale Commercial Fishery in The Bahamas, 60 GULF AND CARIBBEAN 
FISHERIES INST. (2007) 162, 164 (showing results of the five most abundant species landed by 
artisanal fishermen at New Provence). 
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Even if the Bahamas establishes fishing zones exclusively for artisanal 
fishermen, Chinese vessels have ignored these boundaries in other 
countries, leading to violent conflict.124 For example, in Liberia, 
Chinese DWF vessels regularly collide with artisanal fishing canoes 
and have sprayed artisanal fishermen with hot water when conflicts 
escalate.125 One Liberian fisherman even claimed he was detained on 
a Chinese vessel and severely beaten.126 Although this type of conflict 
is probably less likely in a more developed country like the Bahamas, 
similar conflicts might occur if a bilateral agreement is reached. 
iii. Delimitation of the Bahamas-US Exclusive Economic 
Zone 
In addition the Bahamas’ close proximity to other Caribbean 
countries, it is also located within 200 miles of the United States. 
Therefore, the countries have overlapping EEZs.127 Article 74 of 
UNCLOS states, “[t]he delimitation of the exclusive economic zone 
between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by 
agreement on the basis of international law . . . [and States] shall 
make every effort . . . not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the 
final agreement.”128 The Bahamas and the United States have not yet 
delimited their EEZs and currently disagree on the northern axis of 
the Bahamas’s potential maritime boundary.129 With the EEZ of the 
Bahamas not yet determined, a bilateral fishing agreement risks the 
unauthorized entry by Chinese-owned vessels into waters claimed by 
the United States. Such an entry could further strain diplomatic 
relations over ocean rights between the two countries.130 
 
 124.  See e.g., BLOMEYER ET AL., supra note 21 at 73 (quoting MIKAEL CULLBERG, TO 
DRAW THE LINE: EU FISHERIES AGREEMENTS IN WEST AFRICA 16 (Swedish Society for 
Nature Conservation, 2009)) (noting that Chinese trawlers destroy habitat and fishing traps in 
artisanal zones in Mauritania). 
 125.  China’s DWF Industry, supra note 40, at 104. 
 126.  Id. 
     127.    The World Factbook: The Bahamas, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/bf.html (last updated Nov. 29, 2017) (noting that the United States and the 
Bahamas have not yet delimited their maritime boundaries). 
 128.  Fisheries Resources (Jurisdiction and Conservation) (Act. No. 1/2006) (Bah.) ¶ 74(a). 
 129.  The World Factbook: The Bahamas, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/bf.html (last updated Nov. 29, 2017). 
 130.  Trump offers to Mediate in Protracted South China Sea Feud, BOS. HERALD, Nov. 12, 
2017, http://www.bostonherald.com/news/international/2017/11/trump_offers_to_mediate_in_ 
protracted_south_china_sea_feud.  
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iv. Impact on the Tourism and Sport Fishing Industry 
As previously noted, the tourism and sport fishing industry has a 
greater effect on the Bahamian economy than commercial fishing.131 
However, inadequate catch data for the recreational fishing industry 
makes setting commercial quotas difficult because experts cannot 
determine the fishery’s maximum sustainable yield. Until the 
Bahamas is able to gather more information about the deep-water 
pelagic fishery, it risks overfishing these species by expanding its 
commercial fishing industry. 
III.  LEGAL RESPONSES TO A CHINESE-BAHAMIAN 
COMMERCIAL FISHING AGREEMENT 
The Caribbean Fishery has a number of governance tools 
available to countries and other stakeholders should it wish to object 
to a Chinese-Bahamian commercial fishing agreement. Some of these 
tools provide only short-term solutions, while others are long-term 
strategies intended to change the world’s perception of fishery 
management. 
A. UN Fish Stock Agreement: A Short-term Solution 
UNCLOS Article 63 states, “[w]here the same stock[s] . . . occur 
within the exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States, 
these States shall seek . . . to agree upon the measures necessary to 
coordinate and ensure the conservation and development of such 
stocks.”132 Article 64 requires coastal states and other states whose 
nationals fish the region, including the high seas, for highly migratory 
species (including tuna, mahi-mahi, swordfish, and marlin) to 
cooperate with a view to ensuring conservation and promote 
optimum utilization of the species throughout the region.133 Although 
the United States has not ratified UNCLOS, the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement, signed by both the Bahamas and the United States, 
purports to implement these principles.134 However, in many ways, 
the Fish Stocks Agreement provides more protection for fisheries 
than UNCLOS. First, it “goes further than [UNCLOS] in placing 
emphasis on long-term conservation and sustainable use, rather than 
 
     131.   See supra text accompanying notes 25–27. 
 132.  UNCLOS, supra note 14, at art. 63. 
 133.  See id. at annex I; UNCLOS, supra note 14, at art. 64. 
 134.  CHAKALALL & COCHRANE, supra note 6, at 9. 
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optimum utilization.”135 Also, the agreement refers to “highly 
migratory fish stocks” rather than the mere “highly migratory 
species” list in UNCLOS, which broadens the range of resources to 
which the agreement applies.136 For these reasons, the Fish Stocks 
Agreement is a powerful weapon for opponents to a bilateral fishing 
agreement in the Caribbean. 
The United States or another Caribbean country could use 
climate change and the Fish Stocks Agreement to prevent a Chinese-
Bahamian bilateral agreement. Article 7 of the Fish Stocks 
Agreement states, 
If a natural phenomenon has a significant adverse 
impact on the status of straddling fish stocks or 
highly migratory fish stocks, States shall adopt 
conservation and management measures on an 
emergency basis to ensure that fishing activity does 
not exacerbate such adverse impact. States shall also 
adopt such measures on an emergency basis where 
fishing activity presents a serious threat to the 
sustainability of such stocks.137 
This provision implements UNCLOS’s “precautionary principle” 
by seeking to reduce the probability of adverse events when the level 
of uncertainty and potential costs of the event are significant and full 
reversibility is not ensured.138 Unlike the rigid precautionary 
principle, however, the Fish Stocks Agreement adopts the 
“precautionary approach,” which allows for less stringent measures 
and does not bring all marine fishing activities to a halt.139 
The precautionary approach in Article 6 of the Fish Stocks 
Agreement might be appropriate to slow down a Chinese-Bahamian 
bilateral fishing agreement.140 According to a recent study, the 
 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 34 I.L.M. 1542, 1552 (1995) 
[hereinafter Fish Stocks Agreement]. 
 138. See S.M. Garcia, The Precautionary Principle: Its Implications in Capture Fisheries 
Management, 22 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 99, 101 (1994) (discussing proper application of 
the precautionary principle). 
 139. See SIMON MARR, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE LAW OF THE SEA: 
MODERN DECISION MAKING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 (2003) (distinguishing between the 
“precautionary principle” and the “precautionary approach”). 
 140. Although more research on the actual effects of dead zones on the Bahamas’ fishery 
would probably be needed to prevail on a claim under Article 7, low oxygen levels and habitat 
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ocean’s oxygen content has decreased by more than two percent over 
the last 50 years, potentially due to climate change.141 This 
phenomenon has led to deep-water “dead zones” of reduced oxygen, 
causing habitat loss for “high performance” fish such as marlin, 
swordfish, and other migratory species that need high levels of 
oxygen to survive.142 As a result, these species have become more 
concentrated in high-oxygen areas, leading to potentially over-
optimistic population estimates and placing these species at higher 
risk from near-surface fishing methods.143 The dead zones have also 
been known to cause reproductive problems in some fish.144 
Significantly, the ocean near Andros Island, the site of the 
proposed joint ventures, experienced a substantial decrease in oxygen 
level during the past decade.145 Given the already uncertain capacity 
of the Bahamas deep-water pelagic fishery, expanding the commercial 
fishing sector would conflict with any emergency conservation 
measure under Article 6. It should be noted, however, that 
conservation measures taken under this provision are only temporary, 
so a claim under Article 6 is not a long-term solution.146 
In addition to a preventative measure, the Fish Stocks 
Agreement could be used to limit the scope of a joint venture. 
Paragraph 6 of Article 6 of the Fish Stocks Agreement states, 
For new or exploratory fisheries, States shall adopt 
as soon as possible cautious conservation and 
management measures, including, inter alia, catch 
limits and effort limits. Such measures shall remain 
 
loss might justify emergency conservation measures under the Fish Stocks Agreement if the 
impact is significant. See Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 137. 
 141. See Sunke Schmidtko et al., Decline in Global Oceanic Oxygen Content During the Past 
Five Decades, 542 NATURE 335 (2017) (discussing the decreasing oxygen content of the world’s 
oceans). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. What Causes Ocean “Dead Zones”?, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN,  
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/ocean-dead-zones/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2017). 
 145. See Global Ocean De-Oxygenation Quantified, GEOMAR, https://www.geomar.de/en/ 
news/article/weniger-sauerstoff-in-allen-meeren/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2017) (presenting a 
graphic that displays the percent change of dissolved oxygen in the global ocean over the last 
decade). 
 146. Note that the precautionary principle under the Fish Stocks Agreement only justifies a 
temporary stay of a bilateral fishing agreement that expands the Bahamian commercial fishing 
industry. It does not justify the more aggressive approach of allowing a country to utilize its 
EEZ solely for sport fishing. See Garcia, supra note 138, at 122 (noting that the principle, “if 
incorrectly applied, is an attempt to re-allocate resources to non-consumptive users, often 
without much reference or concern towards intra-generational equity or scientific objectivity.”).  
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in force until there are sufficient data to allow 
assessment of the impact of the fisheries on the long-
term sustainability of the stocks, whereupon 
conservation and management measures based on 
that assessment shall be implemented. The latter 
measures shall, if appropriate, allow for the gradual 
development of the fisheries.147 
Here, the interpretation of “new or exploratory fisheries,” is 
critical. Although the agreement does not define “new,” 
“exploratory,” or “fishery,” this provision might apply to impose 
stringent catch limits on a newly formed deep-water pelagic 
commercial fishing industry.148 For instance, the Commission for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources defines a “new” 
fishery as a “species and (or) fishing on a ground that has not been 
previously fished,” which encompasses proposals to expand a fishing 
area.149 Although this definition is not directly relevant to the Fish 
Stocks Agreement, opponents could similarly argue that the 
Bahamian deep-water pelagic fishery is a “new” or “exploratory” 
fishery because it has not been commercially fished.150 In such a case, 
the aforementioned data collection problems should trigger 
conservation measures under this provision and limit the impact of 
China’s DWF. 
A. Escaping the Concept of Optimum Utilization: A Global Shift 
The Fish Stock Agreement moves away from the concept of 
Maximum Sustainable Yield and towards concepts like “long term 
conservation” and “sustainable use.”151 However, the Fish Stock 
 
 147. Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 137, at ¶ 6 (emphasis added). 
 148. See MARR, supra note 139, at 17 (noting that the precautionary approach restricts pilot 
activities that might pose an irreversible environmental threat); see also, Fish Stocks Agreement, 
supra note 134 at ¶ 2 (“States shall be more cautious when information is uncertain, unreliable 
or inadequate. The absence of adequate scientific information shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing or failing to take conservation and management measures.”). 
 149. EVELYNE MELTZER & SUSANNA FULLER, THE QUEST FOR SUSTAINABLE 
INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES: REGIONAL EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT THE 1995 UNITED NATIONS 
FISH STOCKS AGREEMENT 123 (2009).  
 150. See Track a Fishery, MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://fisheries.msc.org/en/ 
fisheries/@@search (last visited Dec. 28, 2017) (noting that the only recognized fishery in the 
Bahamas is the Bahamian Spiny Lobster Fishery); What is a Fishery, MARINE STEWARDSHIP 
COUNCIL, https://www.msc.org/track-a-fishery/what-is-a-fishery (last visited Dec. 28, 2017) 
(recognizing that the FAO defines a fishery by, among other factors, the type of fishers and the 
purpose of the activities). 
 151. See supra text accompanying notes 137–39.  
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Agreement does not apply to all species– it only prevents certain 
actions both inside a country’s EEZ and in the high seas that affect 
migratory species.152 Therefore, UNCLOS’s Maximum Sustainable 
Yield concept still prevails over domestic fisheries that target non-
migratory species. As long as this concept controls, countries will 
continue to view fisheries as exploitable resources and underestimate 
their conservation value.153 
Admittedly, some countries have tried to integrate amorphous 
principles of long-term conservation and sustainability into the rigid 
Maximum Sustainable Yield formula. For example, in the Bahamas 
and the United States, “optimum yield” is defined as the amount of 
resources “which will provide the greatest overall benefit to the 
nation with particular reference to food production and recreational 
opportunities, and which is prescribed as such on the basis of the 
maximum sustainable yield from a fishery as modified by any 
economic, social, or ecological factors.”154 Furthermore, the 
precautionary approach, which has arguably become accepted 
international law,155 promotes the conservation value of a fishery 
above its economic value (but only when uncertainty exists).156 
However, these concepts do not clearly and explicitly give a country 
free reign to establish a sport-fishing conservation area.157 Until 
countries like the Bahamas are freed from the obligation of optimum 
utilization, this type of “exploitation” cannot be achieved. Instead, 
these countries will always feel pressure to exploit their fisheries by 
 
 152. See Management of Large Pelagic Fisheries in CARICOM Countries, FAO, 2004, at 8 
(“The agreement sets out general principles for the conservation and management of straddling 
and highly migratory fish stocks . . . that parties to the agreement are to apply on the high seas 
as well as within their EEZs.”). 
 153. See Hern, supra note 6, at 195 (noting that UNCLOS “retains the monolithic vision of a 
global commercial fishery that may not be of service to future generations of resource 
managers”). 
 154. WILLIAM R. EDESON & JEAN-FRANCOIS PULVENIS, THE LEGAL REGIME OF 
FISHERIES IN THE CARIBBEAN REGION 48 (1983). 
 155. See Simon Marr, The Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases: The Precautionary Approach and 
Conservation and Management of Fish Resources, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 815, 823 (2000) (discussing 
the conflict among international legal authors concerning the status of the precautionary 
approach as a binding norm of customary international law). 
 156. See Hern, supra note 6, at 194 (describing the precautionary principle as a temporary 
buffer between the MSY and the requirement of optimum utilization when scientific uncertainty 
exists).  
 157. Hern, supra note 6; see John M. MacDonald, Appreciating the Precautionary Principle 
as an Ethical Evolution in Ocean Management, 26 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 255, 257 (1995) 
(arguing that application of the precautionary principle to fisheries management decisions must 
be changed to reflect the value choices inherent in these decisions).  
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expanding their own commercial fishing sectors or executing bilateral 
agreements with distant water fishing nations. 
A legal regime that gives countries more freedom to promote 
conservation within its EEZ would be more beneficial to Caribbean 
countries than mere restraints and exceptions to optimum utilization. 
For example, countries like the Bahamas would receive much higher 
exchange value on their living resources by using their EEZ solely for 
sports and recreational fishing and marketing its under-exploited 
fishery “as a scarce resource in an overfished world.”158 Alternatively, 
the Bahamas could operate its EEZ primarily as an eco-tourism area 
but make exceptions for small-scale fishermen by keeping artisanal 
fishing areas or expanding aquaculture industry.159 This approach 
would allow Bahamians to continue to feed their communities and 
preserve their culture. Since Caribbean countries have the 
infrastructure to support major tourism economies and hold a 
competitive advantage by being relatively unspoiled by major 
commercial fishing industries, they would be prime candidates for 
such a conservation and recreational fishing area.160 In fact, the 
Bahamas has already experimented with this idea, prohibiting all 
commercial shark fishing in its EEZ.161 Although shark fins are a 
desirable product on the international market, the Bahamian 
government instead sought to protect the $110 million recreational 
shark diving industry.162 The United States and other neighboring 
coastal countries would be wise to support this type of system since it 
prevents the problems that accompany bilateral agreements between 
Caribbean countries and other distant water fishing nations. 
Implementing such a legal regime has a number of challenges. 
First, it would constitute a major shift in global fisheries management. 
 
 158. Id. at 195. Under such a scheme, the Bahamas would still need to implement catch 
limits for sport fishers to prevent them from “essentially engaging in commercial fishing ‘under 
the guise of sport fishing.’” Smith & Zeller, supra note 27, at 16. 
 159. Hern, supra note 6, at 195. The Bahamas has experimented with aquaculture 
production for some pelagic fish, but this industry is not currently developed. See CARIBBEAN 
REGIONAL FISHERIES MECHANISM, supra note 3, at 9–10, tbl.4 (noting experimental rearing of 
cobia in sea cages).  
 160. See generally discussion, supra Section II.A (describing the Bahamas’ fishery and 
economy).  
 161. Bahamas Acts to Protect Sharks, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (July 5, 2011), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/about/news-room/press-releases/2011/07/05/bahamas-acts-to-
protect-sharks.  
 162. Andrea R. Haas et al., The Contemporary Economic Value of Elasmobranchs in the 
Bahamas: Reaping the Rewards of 25 Years of Stewardship and Conservation, 207 BIOLOGICAL 
CONSERVATION 55, 59 (2017). 
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Furthermore, the United States’ ability to lead this movement is 
uncertain. Although UNCLOS is widely regarded as customary 
international law, the United States is one of the few countries to 
never ratify the agreement.163 Its status under UNCLOS gives it 
credibility to lead the charge against one of the treaty’s fundamental 
tenets. However, its unwillingness to ratify the almost unanimous 
agreement has hurt its global reputation as a leader in ocean policy 
reform. If the United States wants to promote a change from 
UNCLOS’s concept of optimum utilization, it must determine which 
position gives it more credibility. 
Another hurdle in implementing such a regime is China’s status 
as a nonparty under the Fish Stocks Agreement. China has explicitly 
refused to ratify the agreement, citing disagreements surrounding 
provisions that allow countries other than the flag state164 to use force 
during inspection of fishing vessels.165 Therefore, China, one of the 
world’s largest DWF nations, is not legally obligated under the most 
significant conservation and sustainability provisions in High Seas 
fisheries management. This undermines a regime that allows for a 
country to use its EEZ primarily as a sports fishing conservation area 
because of the highly migratory nature of deep-water pelagic fish. If 
Chinese DWFs ignore sustainable fishing practices, coastal countries 
will have no incentive to create a sport fishing conservation area 
because Chinese vessels fishing on the High Seas will deplete their 
fish stocks. Therefore, the countries seeking to implement such a 
regime would have to give up something to gain China’s compliance 
with the Fish Stock Agreement. 
Given China’s refusal to recognize the recent arbitral tribunal 
ruling in the South China Sea–166 a tribunal established based on the 
rules prescribed in Annex VII of UNCLOS–167 countries could be 
skeptical that China would comply with the Fish Stock Agreement, 
even if it were ratified. Therefore, countries would only value China’s 
ratification if they could be assured that China would enforce the 
agreement with its DWF. Countries seeking increased sustainability 
 
 163. Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N., 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-
6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en (last visited Dec. 28, 2017). 
     164.   A flag state is “the State in whose territory the Ship is registered.” UNCLOS art. 91(1). 
 165. Mallory Testimony, supra note 8, at 5. 
     166.   Tom Phillips, Oliver Holmes & Owen Bowcott, Beijing rejects tribunal’s ruling in South 
China Sea case, THE GUARDIAN, July 12, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/ 
jul/12/philippines-wins-south-china-sea-case-against-china. 
     167.   See generally UNCLOS, supra note 14, at Annex VII. 
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have a few bargaining chips they could give up to gain China’s 
support. With the growing global disapproval of capacity subsidies, 
evidenced by the environmental provisions of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership,168 partial allowance of subsidies might convince China to 
support a governance regime that allows large-scale sport and 
conservation fisheries. However, this approach has some problems. 
Given China’s reliance on these subsidies, the country is unlikely to 
agree to any restriction, even if some subsidies are allowed. 
Furthermore, if the United States views fishing subsidies as the 
ultimate problem behind overfishing, softening its stance on this issue 
may be a poor tradeoff.169 
Proponents of a conservation regime could also reconsider their 
position on the Fish Stock Agreement’s inspection provisions, which 
are China’s biggest concern with the agreement. However, given flag 
states’ inability to adequately monitor Chinese DWF vessels, 
countries like the United States might want as much inspection ability 
as possible. 
Although both of these solutions are problematic, proponents of 
a conservation regime must find a way to get China’s support in order 
to have a chance at successfully integrating international law concepts 
that allow a country to use its EEZ primarily for sport and 
recreational fishing. 
A. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RESPONSES TO A CHINESE-
BAHAMIAN COMMERCIAL FISHING AGREEMENT 
The United States could also use political influence or economic 
incentives to prevent a Chinese-Bahamian commercial fishing 
agreement. As the Bahamas’ leading trade partner, the United States 
could pressure the country into abandoning the deal. The United 
States government has already leveraged this tactic to some extent, 
stating that such an agreement would endanger “security, 
cooperation, tourism, economic interrelations, economic  
 
 
 
 168. Trans-Pacific Partnership Art. 20.16 (draft Feb. 4, 2016) (TPP Final Draft). 
 (“[T]he Parties acknowledge that . . . fisheries subsidies that contribute to overfishing and 
overcapacity, and illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing can have significant 
negative impacts on trade, development and the environment . . . .”). 
 169. See generally Anastasia Telesetsky, Following the Leader: Eliminating Perverse Global 
Fishing Subsidies Through Unilateral Domestic Trade Measures, 65 ME. L. REV.  627 (2013) 
(proposing the total elimination of fishing subsidies). 
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contributions . . . [and] would most certainly have a negative impact 
on our relations with [the Bahamas].”170 
The United States could also attempt to prevent a bilateral 
agreement by encouraging American investment in Bahamian 
tourism, hotels, agriculture, and infrastructure. Since Chinese 
investment in these areas was a principal motivation behind the 
discussions, the United States can eliminate the Bahamas’ incentive 
to do a deal by filling this void itself.171 The United States must 
dramatically increase its efforts to compete with China in this domain. 
Currently, China is the only country that has signed any type of 
bilateral investment treaty with the Bahamas.172 Notably, Chinese 
companies were major financers of a $4.2 billion luxury resort in 
Nassau173 and a $2.6 billion port facility in Freeport.174 This activity is 
not limited to the Bahamas, as Chinese investment in the Caribbean 
has increased tenfold since 2005.175 Although the United States has 
already established good relations with the Bahamas by way of trade, 
it should consider encouraging investment into a country that is 
desperate to grow its infrastructure. 
Similarly, if a Chinese-Bahamian joint venture becomes 
inevitable, the United States should consider entering into its own 
bilateral fishing agreement with the Bahamas. Although some of the 
same problems with the proposed agreement may persist in a bilateral 
agreement with the United States,176 bilateral fishing agreements are 
not inherently risky. With proper monitoring and control, the 
Bahamian commercial fishing industry can be expanded sustainably. 
However, sustainable growth is doubtful if the Bahamas tries to 
 
 170. Nominations (Immediately Following “Assessing the Colombia Peace Process: The Way 
Forward in U.S.-Columbia Relations” Subcommittee Hearing) Before the S. Comm. on Foreign 
Relations, 115th Cong. (2017), available at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/nominations-
080217. 
 171. See Gray Suggests Chinese Agri-Fisheries Deal Still Open to Negotiation, supra note 64 
(noting that the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries of the Bahamas expressed concern over 
losing Chinese investment in other sectors after failed discussions for a bilateral fishing 
agreement). 
 172. Bilateral Treaty Register, http://mofa.gov.bs/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/BILATERAL-
TREATY-REGISTER2011.pdf (last updated Apr. 8, 2011). 
 173. Shivani Vora, In the Bahamas, a Long-Awaited Opening for Baha Mar Resort, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/17/travel/bahamas-baha-mar-resort-
nassau-hotel-casino-opening.html. 
 174. RICHARD L. BERNAL, INTER-AMERICAN DEV. BANK, CHINESE FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN: POTENTIAL AND PROSPECTS 8 (2016). 
 175. Id. 
176.   Under such an agreement, a question remains whether the Bahamas’ deep-water 
pelagic fishery could sustain both a recreational and commercial fishing industry. 
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expand by partnering with China’s DWF, which often ignores 
sustainable fishing practices and is not monitored by its flag state. 
Instead, the United States is better geographically situated to ensure 
proper control and monitoring over the commercial fleet. However, 
the United States cannot use resource conservation as a veil to 
enhance its own competitiveness in the Caribbean fishery.177 Instead, 
such an agreement must be designed to encourage the Bahamas to 
grow its commercial fishing industry sustainably and responsibly. 
B. CONCLUSION 
Put into context with China’s other DWF enterprises, a bilateral 
fishing agreement with the Bahamas could have devastating 
environmental effects. IUU fishing, international maritime disputes, 
and conflicts with artisanal fishermen are all likely consequences of 
such an agreement. If the Bahamas reopen discussions over such an 
agreement, the United States may be able to use political pressure or 
the Fish Stocks Agreement as a short-term solution. However, a 
global shift in fisheries management is needed to promote the long-
term sustainability of the Caribbean Fishery. The recent Chinese-
Bahamian discussions should motivate United States to lead such a 
shift. 
 
 
 177. See China’s DWF Industry, supra note 40, at 106 (“[S]ome developed DWF countries, 
in order to enhance their own competitiveness in areas, will certainly use the excuse of resource 
conservation to keep other new countries out, such as by signing agreements with these host 
countries that limit the number of countries and fishing boats in certain areas.”); MacDonald, 
supra note 157, at 257 (noting that critics of the precautionary principle view it as a way to 
promote cultural imperialism). 
